Conflicts of redistribution in contemporary Maori society: Leadership and the Tainui settlement by Meijl, A.H.M. van
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/63096
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
260
CONFLICTS OF REDISTRIBUTION IN
CONTEMPORARY MAORI SOCIETY:
LEADERSHIP AND THE TAINUI SETTLEMENT
TOON VAN MEIJL
University of Nijmegen.
Over the past decade, the New Zealand Government made great strides in 
redressing long-standing Mäori grievances, and settling the grave injustices 
that were inflicted on Mäori in the 19th century, when they were largely 
dispossessed of their lands. Nevertheless, this settlement process is rather 
controversial for two reasons. First, the government negotiates settlements 
only with “tribal organisations”, whereas 80 percent of the Mäori population 
is currently living in urban environments in which tribal connections have 
lost a great deal of meaning (Maaka 1994). There seems to be a growing 
awareness in New Zealand that somehow this group needs to be included in 
the settlement process, which has become particularly apparent and publicly 
debated in the context of the settlement of Mäori claims to New Zealand 
fisheries (e.g., Barcham 1998, Webster 2002). Second, the socio-political 
organisation of Mäori society has changed radically since the 19th century, 
which raises questions regarding the representation of descendants of the 
originally dispossessed Mäori people. Who are the rightful heirs of the 
traditional owners? This question is entangled with the more fundamental 
questions about the nature of property rights in the 19th century. Who 
owned the land and other resources: extended families, sub-tribes, tribes, 
or super-tribes? What were the political relationships between leaders 
at various levels of the hierarchical kinship structure? In this essay, I 
address these questions in the context of analysing the Tainui settlement 
and controversies surrounding its implementation. 
In 1995, the Tainui were the first Mäori group to sign a major settlement 
of their historic grievances, resulting from the confiscation of their lands 
and natural resources in 1864. The British Monarch, Queen Elizabeth II of 
England, travelled to New Zealand to sign the Act that passed into law the 
agreement negotiated between the Tainui leadership and the New Zealand 
Government.1 The agreement included a formal apology from the Crown, 
which the Queen made, and provided for the return of three percent of the 
lands originally confiscated. The value of the returned lands was estimated 
at approximately NZ$170 million.
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Four years later, however, Tainui assets had declined by NZ$40 million. 
At the same time, newspapers almost daily reported court cases involving 
Tainui factions, notably a group of Tainui administrators/accountants versus 
some representatives of the Tainui tribal leadership that has been “housed” 
in the Mäori King Movement since 1858. In this article I examine what went 
wrong in the aftermath of the settlement and some of the structural causes 
of political conflicts within the Tainui Confederation, trying to disentangle 
the essentialised meanings of “traditionalist” arguments concerning tribal 
leadership in relation to the “modern” arguments for the introduction of 
democracy within the tribe. I begin with a brief excursion into the history 
of the Tainui and their claim.
THE TAINUI CANOE
The Tainui Mäori claim descent from the crew of the Tainui waka or 
‘canoe’ that sailed from Eastern Polynesia to New Zealand about 1000 years 
ago. The members of this canoe explored and settled in the central North 
Island. Over the years their population increased and they formed distinct 
groups or iwi, known as Ngäti Mahuta, Ngäti Haua, Ngäti Maniapoto, Ngäti 
Maru, Ngäti Raukawa, Hauraki and Waikato (Jones and Biggs 1995, Kelly 
1949). In pre-European times, the relationship between these groups was 
rather loose since, like most Mäori, they lived in relatively autonomous, 
extended family communities. 
There is widespread agreement in anthropology that the hapü, usually 
translated as ‘sub-tribe’, was the central unit of the tribal structure of Mäori 
society. A hapü defined itself by descent from an apical, often eponymous 
ancestor, and was made up of a group of kin occupying a common territory 
and living together in a communal settlement, and composed of a number 
of whänau or ‘extended families’. Several hapü made up a more inclusive 
group linked together by descent from a more remote founding ancestor. 
Such groups were called iwi, a term that is nowadays usually translated as 
‘tribe’. This designation is misleading because it suggests that iwi were at 
the core of the socio-political organisation and from them all other units of 
organisation derived. Rather, the composition of iwi was loose and flexible, 
and iwi probably did not develop as corporate groups until in the 19th 
century in the context of ongoing colonisation (Ballara 1998, Firth 1959, 
Meijl 1995, Webster 1997,). 
The highest level of the socio-political organisation of Mäori society was 
the waka or ‘canoe’, made up of all iwi whose remote ancestors had reached 
the shores of New Zealand on the same canoe, such as the Tainui canoe. 
Political or economic co-operation between iwi probably did not take place 
until the beginning of the 19th century, when inter-tribal warfare erupted 
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following the introduction of the musket by traders and missionaries (Owens 
1981). In the battles that broke out in the 1820s, tribal associations were 
formed and paramount chiefs emerged, possibly for the first time in history. 
Military coalitions between the Waikato people led by Te Wherowhero and 
other Tainui tribes contributed to an unprecedented political endorsement 
of sentimental ties between iwi whose members traced their ancestry to the 
crew of the Tainui canoe. The key role that Te Wherowhero played in the 
development of the coalition among iwi of the Tainui canoe would later 
prompt his coronation as first Mäori King (Jones 1959). 
THE MÄORI KING MOVEMENT AND THE CONFISCATION OF THEIR LAND
In 1858 a Mäori King was elected, who stood above the iwi and even 
all waka or canoes, as a result of a political movement that emerged in the 
beginning of the 1850s (Meijl 1993). Following the signing of the Treaty 
of Waitangi in 1840, more and more land deals between Europeans and 
Mäori led to conflict as Mäori gradually became aware that Europeans 
believed they had obtained and owned the land permanently. Resistance to 
the increasing alienation of Mäori land caused various iwi to disavow their 
inter-tribal rivalry and discuss their common interests. Inter-tribal meetings 
were held throughout New Zealand to work out a common strategy in order 
to retain control of Mäori land. In the first instance these meetings of what 
later was known as the movement for kotahitanga ‘oneness’ were aimed 
towards putting a tapu ‘prohibition’ on land sales within certain boundaries. 
But soon the notion of a Mäori King took shape (Sinclair 1969).
To create a confederation with one chief designated as Mäori King in a 
society of autonomous iwi was not easy. Though the kingship was offered 
to several paramount chiefs, many called to Potatau Te Wherowhero of 
the Waikato iwi. Potatau eventually consented to election as King and his 
coronation ceremony was held at Ngaruawahia on 2 June 1858 (Buddle 
1860:13, Sinclair 1959:264). Initially 23 iwi supported the Mäori King, 
mostly from the Waikato and Taupo districts. Other tribes refused to pledge 
allegiance to the King, but they did support the movement’s policy of 
withholding land from sale. Thus Potatau provided a focus for Mäori 
discontent regarding European settlement.
The influence of Potatau’s new office should not be exaggerated, given 
that there were differences among Mäori regarding European settlement. 
Yet, the kingship did make the New Zealand Government nervous. Potatau 
had the authority to withhold land from the market, so the Governor’s main 
problem was undoubtedly that the Kingitanga or ‘King Movement’ was 
substantially an anti-land-selling “league” (Gorst 1864: passim). European 
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settlers voiced strong objections against the King, and gradually they gained 
the Government’s sympathy. 
In the late 1850s the political atmosphere in New Zealand was decidedly 
tense and the Government was desperate to control the King Movement. 
War finally broke out in March 1860 (Belich 1986, Sinclair 1961). The 
Waikato area was invaded on 12 July 1863, when General Cameron and his 
troops crossed the Mangatawhiri River, which demarcated the Kingitanga 
territory within which no land was to be sold (Mahuta 1995a:70). The wars 
lasted until the end of 1864, after which the government confiscated three 
million acres of Mäori land in the most fertile and cultivatable areas of the 
North Island. The Kingitanga tribes lost 486,502 hectares (1,202,172 acres) 
of land.2 Most of the forested hill country and the steep limestone valleys 
of the more extreme Maniapoto tribes was left untouched. This omission 
highlighted the motives of the government. The confiscations were plainly 
in the service of European settlement and agricultural development and the 
argument of punishing the rebels was merely a pretext.
THE LAND CLAIM OF THE MÄORI KING MOVEMENT3
Most of the land confiscated in 1864 belonged to the Waikato iwi, the 
main iwi of the Tainui Confederation of tribes and the iwi from which the 
Mäori King had been elected. Other Tainui iwi were hardly affected. As a 
result, the main cause of the Mäori King Movement soon became identified 
with the central aim of the landless Waikato people. The second Mäori 
King, Täwhiao, who succeeded his father Potatau in 1860, concentrated 
his energies on seeking redress for the confiscations. For this reason, he 
encountered great difficulties securing support to make the kingship a 
politically effective institution for a greater number of tribes (Williams 
1969:47). Nonetheless, Täwhiao did manage to keep all those tribes united 
that had been affected by the confiscations, including parts of Taranaki. 
The Mäori King Movement directly approached the British Crown twice 
to seek redress for the confiscations. In 1884, Täwhiao led a deputation 
to England and in 1914 the fourth Mäori King also presented the British 
Crown with a petition asserting that the confiscations were in violation of 
the Treaty of Waitangi. In both instances, the Kings were referred to the 
New Zealand Government as the appropriate place to seek redress (Jones 
1968:137-8; King 1977:75). 
During the First World War , the New Zealand Government sought to 
conscript Mäori soldiers, but in the Waikato the call to fight for “King and 
Country” fell on deaf ears (Mahuta 1981:6-7). Waikato Mäori refused to 
be conscripted. In 1927, this refusal eventually prompted the Government 
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to set up a Royal Commission to inquire into the confiscations, chaired 
by Justice Sim. One year later, the Commission concluded that the land 
confiscations had been “excessive” and recommended compensation by 
an annual payment of £ 3,000 (AJHR 1928, G-7:17). Subsequently, the 
charismatic Princess Te Puea began negotiations for a settlement. After 
18 years of negotiations, the New Zealand Government and the leaders 
of the King Movement reached agreement on financial compensation 
in the form of an annual grant of £6,000 for 50 years and of £5,000 
thereafter in perpetuity. 
After Princess Te Puea accepted the final bid, the government moved 
to draft the Waikato-Maniapoto Mäori Claims Settlement Bill in order to 
legalise the settlement and to establish the Waikato Mäori Trust Board to 
administer the compensation funds. Interestingly, however, the Kingitanga 
leader Pei Jones, himself of Maniapoto descent, wrote to the Government 
pointing out that, although 90 percent of all beneficiaries of the compensation 
were members of the Waikato tribes, some other tribes of the Tainui 
confederation were also affected by the confiscations and that, therefore, the 
most appropriate name of the Trust Board was the Tainui Maori Trust Board 
(hereinafter TMTB).4 It is most likely that Princess Te Puea was behind this 
submission to name the future tribal authority the Tainui Maori Trust Board 
(Robert Mahuta pers. comm.). This request from the headquarters of the 
Kingitanga was clearly a ploy to keep the strongest supporters of the King 
Movement united under the umbrella of the TMTB, including those who 
had retained their land. 
Although the TMTB was initially established to administer the annual 
grant for Tainui beneficiaries, subsequent legislation gradually widened 
its functions. The 1955 Mäori Trust Board Act broadened the power and 
responsibility of the TMTB in respect of social and economic development 
(TMTB 1988). The turning point in the recent history of the Board and the 
Tainui people at large, however, was the publication of The Tainui Report 
by the Tainui chief Robert Mahuta and the development consultant Kenneth 
Egan in 1982 (Mahuta 1995b). This report highlighted underdevelopment 
within the Tainui region. As a result, the Trust Board took a more proactive 
role in development and other issues at both tribal and national levels. A 
positive consequence of the re-organisation of the TMTB in the 1980s was that 
it simultaneously prepared the Tainui people to resubmit their longstanding 
claim to the government when new legislation made this possible. 
When, in 1986, the Labour government mandated the Waitangi Tribunal 
to examine all claims to violations of the Treaty of Waitangi, Tainui 
immediately filed a claim with the Tribunal over the confiscated lands, the 
Waikato River and the West Coast Harbours. In 1987, however, the Crown 
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made a legal mistake that allowed the Tainui people to negotiate directly 
with the government about their longstanding grievances, rather than going 
through the Tribunal process. The Government had moved to transfer lands 
held in Crown ownership to semi-private State Owned Enterprises and did 
not take into account that Clause 9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 
prohibited the Crown from acting “in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi”. This legality provided Tainui with 
the possibility of stopping the sale of Coalcorp. In 1989, the Appeal Court 
finally forbid the government selling Coalcorp without proper safeguards for 
the Tainui people (see also Meijl 1999:275-77).5 Further, the Appeal Court 
was unanimous in its judgement that Tainui was entitled to the equivalent of 
a substantial portion of the coal resources in the Waikato, the exact amount 
being left to negotiations between the Crown and the TMTB. 
The government remained reluctant to enter into direct negotiations with 
the TMTB, mainly because it was unprepared for the radical potential of 
Mäori claims. Nevertheless, both the Labour governments in the 1980s 
and the National governments in the 1990s recognised that many of the 
longstanding Mäori grievances were legitimate.6 After years of deliberation 
and periodic negotiations with several tribes on major claims, the National 
government, re-elected in 1993, finally announced its strategy for settling 
Mäori claims towards the end of 1994. The Crown set 2000 as a target date 
for the settlement of Treaty of Waitangi claims, i.e., for the completion of 
the hearings and of the negotiation of compensation agreements with Mäori 
iwi. At the same time, it proposed establishing over a ten-year period a 
settlement fund of NZ$1 billion to settle all historical Mäori claims.7 This 
fund came to be known as the “fiscal envelope”. The response to the “fiscal 
envelope” proposal from Mäori people was unanimously negative: it was 
rejected outright (Gardiner 1996). The fear was that the fiscal envelope 
would damage Mäori proprietary rights under the Treaty. 
Given this situation, many were surprised when on 21 December 1994, 
barely ten days after the introduction of the “fiscal envelope” proposal, a 
final settlement of the Tainui land claim was announced after a “Heads of 
Agreement” had been signed between Tainui leaders and the New Zealand 
Government.8 Yet, the TMTB had rejected the “fiscal envelope” proposal 
along with all other iwi. This was a strong political statement, because the 
Crown had made it clear that the amount of money available in the 
envelop for settling Mäori claims was not negotiable. Consequently, the 
signing of the “Heads of Agreement” by the Tainui leadership was highly 
controversial and met with severe opposition from other Mäori groups 
(Gardiner 1996:128-29).
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Criticism of the TMTB did not deter Queen Te Atairangikaahu of the 
Mäori King Movement and the Government from signing a comprehensive 
settlement of the Tainui people’s land grievances on the eve of the 29th 
anniversary of the Queen’s coronation in May 1995.9 The settlement 
included a formal apology from the Crown, acknowledging that it acted 
unjustly in dealing with the King Movement in 1863, and provided for 
the return of 14,165 ha (about 35,000 acres) of Crown land or about three 
percent of the land originally confiscated. The value of the restored lands 
was estimated at approximately NZ$170 million and the annual proceeds 
from rents and leases to amount to between NZ$7 and 14 million per 
annum.10 In November 1995, during her visit to New Zealand, Queen 
Elizabeth II signed the document, passing into law the Waikato Raupatu 
Claims Settlement Act. 
CONTROVERSIES AROUND THE SETTLEMENT
Criticisms from Mäoridom
The sheer magnitude of the Tainui settlement could not have been 
anticipated in the 1980s, indicative that some real progress had been made 
in redressing Mäori grievances. Yet, the Tainui settlement was controversial 
right from the beginning. Initial criticisms were expressed by other iwi 
accusing Tainui of betraying the rest of Mäoridom, believing that the Tainui 
settlement set a precedent within the terms of the “fiscal envelop” for 
negotiations with other iwi (Gardiner 1996:128-29). Tainui rejected this 
criticism. Its leadership argued that it had never concurred with the concept 
of the settlement envelop and pointed to the Heads of Agreement statement 
clause “that knowledge of the Crown’s proposed policy for settling natural 
resources claims does not reflect acceptance of that policy by Waikato-
Tainui” (clause 7.1.v). Until the fiscal cap was removed after the elections 
of 1996—this clause notwithstanding, the government and other Mäori iwi 
referred to the Tainui settlement as being based on these policies. This is 
not surprising since the automatic escalation clause included in the Deed 
of Settlement (see “Attachment 9”, entitled “Relativity Mechanism”), 
later confirmed by the Act, indicates Tainui’s acceptance of a number 
of Crown proposals, thus justifying the assertion that Tainui settled 
its claim within the framework of the “fiscal envelop”. The “relativity 
clause” ensures that 
the Waikato settlement will always be the largest Maori settlement for 
the next 50 years. If another tribe receives a settlement which exceeds in 
value the Waikato settlement, the Crown will provide additional value to… 
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ensure… that the Waikato settlement is the largest maintaining its 17 % 
values of any monies set aside by the Crown for Maori claims11 (“Attachment 
9”, entitled “Relativity Mechanism”).
The figure of 17 percent was derived from the fiscal cap of NZ$1 billion.12
Disapproval from within the Tainui Confederation: representation and 
consultation 
External criticism was always to be expected in Mäori society, given the 
number of autonomous iwi, all with their own claims before the Waitangi 
Tribunal, but there was also strong internal disapproval of the settlement. 
Within Tainui, issues raised before and after the settlement should be 
distinguished. Beforehand, questions were brought up as to whether the 
negotiators represented the entire Tainui Confederation and critics deplored 
the lack of consultation with the “flaxroots” in the course of the negotiations. 
Criticisms were also levelled at the proposed new trust that was vested with 
the returned properties and that was to be controlled by the tribal leadership 
held by the royal family. The common denominator of both criticisms is the 
exclusive identification of the Tainui tribes with the Kingitanga, both 
in the negotiations and in the later implementation of the settlement. 
Subsequently, the central control held by the royal family in the new, 
post-settlement tribal structure is controversial too within the Tainui 
Confederation of Tribes. 
Before discussing further internal criticisms of the settlement, what is 
meant by the notion “Tainui” needs to be clarified. The history of the claim 
suggests that the entity Tainui is in fact a recent construct. Until recently, 
people’s primary affiliation was to iwi (tribes), not to waka (super-tribes). 
The notion of Tainui, referring to the waka, only developed after the 
establishment of the TMTB in 1946, named thus probably at the request 
of Princess Te Puea. 
Whether the Tainui Trust Board could keep the Tainui Confederation, 
including the iwi not affected by confiscations, united was always debatable; 
in the 1980s, however, the proclaimed unity of the Tainui Confederation 
appeared largely symbolic. Two Tainui tribes, Hauraki and Ngäti Maniapoto, 
set up their own trust boards in order to be able to administer their own 
development programmes (see Mäori Trust Boards Amendment Act 1988, 
Meijl 1990:120). A proposal was made to set up a rünanga ‘council’ 
to coordinate the several Tainui trust boards to maintain some political 
unity along with the symbolic unity engendered by the King Movement. 
But Hauraki soon dropped out permanently. Development was clearly 
weakening the unity of the Tainui Confederation. 
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Further disintegration of the Tainui Confederation occurred under the 
impact of the settlement negotiations. There were significant changes of 
names. Both in the “Heads of Agreement” and the “Deed of Settlement” 
on the “Tainui” claim, the designation of the tribal grouping concerned 
was “Waikato-Tainui”. But in the 1995 “Deed to Amend the Deed of 
Settlement” every reference to “Waikato-Tainui” was deleted and references 
to “Waikato” only were substituted. The “Claims Settlement Act”, too, 
refers only to “Waikato”. In the strict sense of the term, then, Waikato 
became the legal term for all the hapü affected by the confiscations, while 
Tainui continues to be used mainly as an ideological and symbolic concept 
referring to the descendants of the crew of the Tainui waka and to the 
contemporary adherents of the Mäori King Movement. (I discuss below 
how the name Tainui may also be used to enhance the credibility of tribal 
business operations.)
The ambiguity of the notion “Tainui” also played a role in internal 
criticisms before the settlement was signed. People questioned whether 
all potential beneficiaries of the “Tainui” claim were represented in the 
negotiations and pointed to a lack of consultation with all concerned hapü. 
The negotiating team was led by Robert Mahuta, the adoptive brother of the 
Mäori Queen, who in 1983 was appointed to the seat of the Mäori Queen 
on the TMTB. The 15 other members representing 33 hapü were elected. 
As director of the Centre for Maaori Studies and Research at the University 
of Waikato, he was the driving force behind the development of Tainui 
as a tribal organisation in the 1980s. Later, he also acted as the principal 
negotiator for the Tainui with the Crown. He had a firm and often expressed 
view that it was incumbent on individual Tainui persons to concern 
themselves with Tainui business and participate in tribal networks and 
forums of debate. In this regard, he repeatedly spoke of two Tainui 
platforms of discussion: the annual round of 28 poukai or Kingitanga loyalty 
gatherings and the bi-monthly meetings of Nga Marae Toopu, an association 
of all Tainui marae communities (Meijl 1990:279-85, 96). These informal 
gatherings, however, were rarely attended by more than a few hundred 
people, except perhaps for poukai at Waahi and Turangawaewae, which are 
respectively the domicile and official residence of the Mäori Queen. This 
little attendance was one of the reasons why the claim that Tainui had its 
own mode of optimally operating consultation was rejected by critics as 
“pathetic nonsense” (Hopa 1995:36).13 
This criticism was not directed to the principal negotiator personally, but 
was aimed at the entire operation of the TMTB. Membership of the TMTB, 
and many other trust boards for that matter, tends to be based more on status 
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than ability, thereby creating and reproducing a tribal autocracy, which 
was in the case of Tainui strongly supportive of the royal family (Hopa and 
Cheater 1996:13). With settlement and the possibility of some real, pecuniary 
advantages for the beneficiaries of the TMTB, the “flaxroots” began 
raising questions about its leadership: its representativeness, consultation, 
information sharing, accountability and decision-making. One argument 
was that the Trust Board should have organised proper consultation with 
all its beneficiaries by circulating more detailed information about the 
negotiations in written form. But there was little the critics could do to 
punish the Board for neglect.
Debates about the representativeness of the Tainui leadership prompted 
the TMTB nevertheless to re-organise its administration and beneficiary 
records. Re-organisation had become necessary because the government 
called for a referendum among the beneficiaries of the TMTB in order to 
pass the Deed of Settlement into law. Then the mandate for the compensation 
agreement appeared to be minimal and the figures in this respect are 
revealing. When the Tainui Trust Board initiated its ambitious development 
programme in 1983, the argument was that the Tainui Confederation 
consisted of 120,000 people (Douglas 1982:28). Over the years, however, 
the Tainui leadership reduced this first estimate of the number of Tainui 
people by almost 50 percent. In 1990, it was not unrealistic to think that the 
government would implement a policy of devolution of government funds 
on a per capita basis. Tainui then claimed that its confederation of tribes 
numbered approximately 62,600 people: 29,700 Waikato, 5,900 Raukawa, 
7,600 Hauraki and 19,400 Maniapoto (Mahuta 1990). These figures were 
also forwarded to the confiscations settlement negotiations.
During the negotiations formal membership became an issue. Exactly 
how many beneficiaries did the TMTB have? About 20,000 were said 
to be on the roll, though more people were expected to register after the 
settlement was signed. Eventually, it appeared that only 11,600 people were 
registered as beneficiaries of the TMTB. All these were asked to accept 
or reject the deal by means of a ballot. However, out of a total of 11,600 
ballots sent out, only 4,680 ballot papers were returned to the Trust Board. 
Of these, 3,029 were in favour and 1,608 were against (43 ballots were 
invalid). So, only 40.4 percent of the registered beneficiaries voted, a 
third of whom (34.4%) rejected the proposal for a settlement.14 Along the 
sidelines many people asserted that they had never received their ballots. 
Yet, despite these low figures, the Trust Board and the Government formally 
accepted the ballot outcome as an adequate mandate for the settlement 
to be sanctioned by law. 
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SETTLEMENT
After the settlement had been signed, controversies shifted from the 
decision-making process to its implementation. Criticism to follow was 
foreshadowed in 1993, when the government intending to show its good will 
to Tainui handed over two properties, Hopuhopu and Te Rapa. These former 
military bases were vested in the Potatau Te Wherowhero Land Holding 
Trust, a tribal trust named after the first Mäori King. Three prominent 
members of the Mäori royal family were appointed as custodial trustees, 
namely the Queen, Dame Te Atairangikaahu, her adoptive brother, Robert 
Mahuta, and her uncle, Tumate Mahuta. The TMTB was made managing 
trustee of the Trust.15 
Hopuhopu and Te Rapa were sited on the ancestral lands of one particular 
hapü, and the descendants of the original occupants, if not owners, of 
the land did not necessarily approve of this Trust structure. Thirty-seven 
members of the hapü challenged the vesting of the two properties in the 
tribe as a whole and appealed to the Mäori Appellate Court. The group of 
litigants claimed to be representing the whole hapü, but they were unable 
to file a formal claim on behalf of the collective hapü, because ‘sub-tribes’ 
have no legal status in New Zealand, and only iwi or waka are recognised 
under trust board legislation. The locals consequently lost their case against 
the claim of the TMTB that the lands were returned to “Waikato and not to 
any one individual” (Hopa 1999:115, note 24). Thus a precedent was set 
for the substitution of original hapü rights by a collective, tribal title under 
the control of the royal family.
The shift of power from hapü to iwi is indeed one of the more contentious 
aspects of the current government strategy to settle Mäori claims. It is true 
that hapü and whänau ‘extended families’ are fluid, expanding and declining, 
and that this an inevitable consequence of ambilineal kinship arrangements 
(Webster 1975). Yet, some hapü are more stable and homogeneous. In the 
late 1980s, however, the government decided it wanted to settle longstanding 
Mäori grievances with tribal (iwi) organisations only. A group of Mäori 
chiefs successfully persuaded the government to focus policies on iwi 
instead of hapü or pan-tribal organisations (Meijl 1997). Their argument was 
that hapü have no formal structure, let alone legal status, that would enable 
them to be used as vehicles for Mäori development or for the settlement of 
claims. For Tainui, the government contended that it wanted to ensure that 
the restitution of land benefited all tribal members, and that the TMTB had 
organised for this to occur “under the mana of the Kingitanga” (quoted in 
Hopa 1999:109; see also Cheater and Hopa 1997:212). The consequence 
of this decision was that all hapü claims to lands and natural resources 
were effectively extinguished. 
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The removal of hapü rights and hapü control of lands and resources 
took legal effect through the organisational structure developed to register 
collective ownership of the assets that were returned to the Waikato tribe 
and the Kingitanga in the recent past. Waikato properties became registered 
in the name of the Kingitanga’s deceased founder, the first Mäori King 
Potatau Te Wherowhero, a title originally created in 1975 to register the 
Kingitanga’s graveyard on Taupiri Mountain. The notion of a tribal title to 
the collective cemetery was unique in New Zealand and initially met little 
opposition. But then, as noted above, it was again used when the military 
bases Hopuhopu and Te Rapa were returned to Waikato in 1993. Its earlier 
use created a precedent of sorts, but in 1993 when it was applied to the 
return of large amounts of confiscated property it caused controversy. The 
controversy concerned not only the vesting of ownership at the iwi instead 
of the hapü level, but also and more importantly the legal interconnection 
between ownership and management, and the exclusive appointment of 
members of the royal family as custodial trustees. 
The reason for vesting the returned lands in the name of a dead ancestor 
was to prevent the sale of the land. No individual can succeed to the title, 
while the beneficiaries of the land are supposed to be the tribe as a whole, 
not any individual person or whänau or hapü. Alienation of land would 
be difficult, because, in addition to the endorsement of the three custodial 
trustees, 75 percent of all beneficiaries would have to agree to a sale. The 
Mäori Queen, her adoptive brother and her uncle were originally appointed 
as custodians. While this structure, with trustees appointed exclusively 
from the royal family, was justified as preventing the possibility of future 
alienation of the returned properties, at the same time it elevated the 
Mäori monarchy, making it a powerful institution in New Zealand, much 
more powerful than it had ever been before. The confiscated lands were 
effectively returned to the royal family, itself belonging to the hapü of Ngäti 
Mahuta, and changed the Mäori monarchy from a landless institution into 
a large landowner. This also substantiated the monarchy’s submerged claim 
to Waikato, Tainui and even pan-Mäori identity and status in the form of the 
Kingitanga (Cheater and Hopa 1997:212). The symbolic meaning of this 
claim was not new, but its institutional implications were unprecedented 
and caused great consternation within the Tainui Confederation, particularly 
within the Waikato iwi and among the tribal leadership, i.e., the royal 
family and numerous other members of the tribe. This became particularly 
evident through arguments that arose in the new organisational structure 
of the tribe.
Initially the TMTB was temporarily managing trustee of the Potatau 
Te Wherowhero Land Holding Trust. In 1999, however, the TMTB was 
Toon van Meijl
272 Conflicts of Redistribution in Contemporary Mäori Society
dissolved; after settlement it became outdated. The dissolution of the 
TMTB was stipulated in the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act of 
1995, which aimed at introducing a strict division between ownership, 
governance and management. The Settlement Act hence established the 
Waikato Raupatu Lands Trust as the legal body holding the Potatau Te 
Wherowhero title, as noted above. The three custodial trustees of the 
royal family held legal ownership of the returned properties vested in 
this trust within this new structure. Governance and management of the 
properties held by the Lands Trust, however, were transferred to the Waikato 
Raupatu Trustee Company. 
The Trustee Company was going to operate through the Kauhanganui,16 
a ‘Great Council’ of 183 people representing 61 marae who signed the 
covenant supporting the Deed of Settlement.17 By signing the tribal 
agreement these marae also endorsed the crucial role of the royal family in 
the custody of the returned properties.18 The Kauhanganui became the sole 
shareholder of the trustee company and in practice was mainly concerned 
with the governance of the tribal companies. The daily management, on 
the other hand, was to be conducted by an executive council of 12, called 
Tekaumaarua.19 Eleven members of the Tekaumaarua are elected from the 
Kauhanganui and the Mäori Queen is entitled to appoint the remaining 
member. The executive of the Kauhanganui were also appointed as directors 
of the Trustee Company. The first executive council of the new organisation 
was elected in April 2000. Until then the TMTB had acted as interim 
executive. The four-and-a-half year hiatus between the signing of the 
Settlement Act and the election of the first executive council undoubtedly had 
to do with the enormous expansion of the tribe’s business operations. 
Since 1995, the Waikato tribe developed three main business interests 
under the umbrella of the Tainui Group Holdings:20 property management 
and development, fishing for both domestic and export markets, and, until 
recently, an investment arm. The Tainui Corporation is the tribe’s property 
management company, acting as landlord to properties Tainui received 
from the settlement, including the University of Waikato. The Tainui 
Development Limited is the tribe’s property development division and aims 
at expanding the returned tribal estate, including residential and commercial 
subdivisions, a four star hotel and adjacent casino in Hamilton, and a 
former Air Force base to be developed into a commercial estate. Investment 
in the fishing industry was in the form of shares in fishing companies. 
Finally, Tainui invested in the Mäori Development Corporation Investment 
Holdings, the tribe’s most recognised company, charged with looking into 
the tribe’s medium to longterm investments, including a rugby league team, 
a holiday resort and a popular hotel in Sydney.
Alongside Waikato’s business interests, the Waikato Lands Trust 
proclaimed itself to be a “charitable trust”, promoting the educational, social, 
spiritual and cultural advancement of its beneficiaries (Hopa 1999:111). 
These activities are advertised broadly, but in a budget of many millions 
only a small percentage of the total settlement is devoted to this purpose. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Tainui leadership was repeatedly criticised 
for its policies of internal distribution. Responding to these criticisms, 
the leadership has consistently interpreted the compensation the tribe 
received as a “land for land” settlement. The Waikato tribe, it argues, aims 
at re-building a tribal estate and the commercial objectives of the tribal 
subsidiaries are to be understood in that light: investing money, adding 
value to the investment and securing the returned properties for future 
generations. Along the same lines, the tribal leadership argued that “[t]he 
Crown still has a duty to provide for proper standards of health, welfare, 
housing, employment and all the basic needs that Maaori people along 
with other citizens require”.21
Criticism of the implementation of the Waikato settlement intensified 
when the new leadership of the tribe announced a 40 million decline in 
assets over the year 1999.22 The announcement inflamed critical media 
reports and reinforced rumours of mismanagement, obscure deals, ridiculous 
investments, feudal relations within the Waikato tribe and nepotism of 
the royal family. This was first elaborated in 1998, when the rightwing 
periodical, The National Business Review, published a scathing attack on 
what it described as “The New Feudalism”. It focused on the aristocratic 
leadership of the tribe that, according to the report, lavished huge amounts 
of money on itself through consultancy fees, big salaries and luxury cars 
at the expense of ordinary Mäori (Anderson 1998). The Tainui leadership 
responded in great detail to most allegations made in this article.23 In view 
of the magazine’s reactionary reputation, many considered the details 
such as the cars of the Mäori Queen, her adoptive brother, his wife and 
their daughters as unconfirmed gossip. When the big loss was announced 
in 2000, however, serious concerns emerged about the effectiveness of 
Waikato management strategies. 
Public apprehension increased when a leadership crisis erupted following 
the publication of the financial report in 2000. The executive council 
sacked the Mäori Queen’s adoptive brother and principal negotiator of 
the settlement from the tribe’s company directorships, holding that he 
was personally responsible for the poor performances of Waikato’s tribal 
business estate. The main reason given for his dismissal was “his desire to 
act alone” (NZH 2000a). Following this, the Mäori Queen moved to dismiss 
the remaining members of the executive council by introducing a resolution 
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in the Kauhanganui calling on them to quit (NZH 2000b). The Queen and her 
advisors, including her adoptive brother, acted by virtue of their conviction 
that as custodial trustees of the Lands Trusts, they were also authorised to 
influence the management of the Trustee Company. The executive council 
contended that as company directors, they had their own management 
responsibility and were, therefore, legally not obliged to tolerate interference 
in the tribe’s businesses by the Trust’s custodial trustees, i.e., the royal 
family. When the Kauhanganui passed the Mäori Queen’s resolution, the 
executive council challenged the decision immediately in the High Court. 
The judge ruled that the Mäori Queen’s resolution to sack the executive was 
“unconstitutional” (Waikato Times 2000).
To summon the Mäori Queen to appear in court was, of course, contrary 
to the monarchy’s supporters’ belief in the inviolability of the head of the 
Kingitanga. Nonetheless, during the second half of 2000, the leadership 
crisis resulted in several court cases involving the Queen. They all concerned 
the management of the tribal companies and the question of who was 
entitled to make decisions about which issues at each level of the tribal 
structure. The royal family, supported by a loyal group of elders, interpreted 
the implementation of the settlement as though it had the power, as legal 
owners of the tribal estate, not only to hold the tribe’s properties under 
trust, but also to intervene in the governance of the trustee company by the 
democratically elected ‘Great Council’ and its daily management by the 
executive council. Against this, the executive council claimed the right to 
act autonomously in the interest of the tribal companies and rejected any 
interference by or on behalf of the royal custodians. In sum, the crisis of 
Tainui after signing the settlement concerned the ambiguity of the formal 
and informal separations between ownership, governance and management 
within the Waikato Raupatu Lands Trust and its business company.
The leadership crisis in the Tainui Confederation of Tribes, headed by the 
Mäori King Movement, continued until the adoptive brother of the Mäori 
Queen died in February 2001. Subsequently, the crisis could not be resolved 
because Mäori custom prescribes that positions remain unfilled until one 
year after the incumbent has passed away. In fact, a lasting resolution is still 
not imminent. On the day of her brother’s tombstone unveiling ceremony, 
one year after his death, the Queen appointed his widow to the vacant 
position in the executive council.
Since early 2002, the leadership crisis among Tainui concerning the role 
of the Mäori monarchy has abated. Within the tribe, all energy has been 
directed toward attempting to meet all debts, to balance the books and to 
restore confidence of lending agencies and on the stock market. Tainui 
appointed a new manager to regain control of the tribal companies and turn 
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the business into a profit-making enterprise, but he resigned a few months 
after taking up the job. He argued that problems within the tribe could not 
be resolved unless governance and management were properly separated. 
He effectively asked for a more reticent role for the royal family, saying that 
there is “an autocracy with Dame Te Ata at the top and a few families around 
her and the rest of the tribe are second-class citizens” (NZH 2002b).
In February 2003, a new executive council was elected, but again this 
was immediately challenged in court. Several Tainui elders argued that the 
election process was flawed. Apparently, not all beneficiaries had formally 
been notified that elections were taking place. In July 2003, the chairman 
of the executive council was dismissed, ironically, shortly after he had 
announced a NZ$8.3 million profit over the previous year, signalling at 
least a financial turnabout. The challenge he posed to the influence of the 
Kingitanga finally led to his removal (Waikato Times 2003c). This incident 
highlights again that the post-settlement crisis within Tainui is rooted in 
the intrinsic relationship between the Kingitanga and the tribal organisation 
that was set up to implement the settlement of the confiscations. Although a 
significant faction of families directly related to the royal family considers 
Kingitanga and Tainui as intricately connected, the crisis is unlikely to be 
resolved unless ownership and governance are unequivocally separated 
in an amended constitution. 
*       *       *
In the 19th century chiefs in Maori society were principally regarded as 
representatives of the people, as primus inter pares or first among equals 
(Oppenheim 1973:105). Their position of authority in the hierarchical 
structure of Maori society was balanced by means of an ideology of 
egalitarianism (Meijl 1994), which served to prevent the development of 
the types of autocratic chiefdoms found in other parts of Polynesia, such 
as Tonga, Hawai‘i and parts of Fiji. The recent settlement signed with 
the Waikato Mäori, who in the negotiations with the government were 
represented by the Mäori monarchy, may have changed this formally and 
legally, at least for the Tainui people. This may be one of the reasons for 
the rift in the Tainui confederation between supporters and antagonists 
of the monarchy. This dispute is unlikely to be resolved unless there is a 
significant change in the structure of leadership.
A preliminary analysis of the crisis that erupted within Tainui after 
they signed a substantial compensation agreement with the New Zealand 
Government to settle their grievances about the unjust confiscations in the 
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19th century suggests one main conclusion. Colonial injustice is difficult to 
redress and in many cases creates new problems, especially regarding the 
internal distribution of compensation within tribal domains. The protracted 
dispute about the distribution of the fisheries settlement illustrates the 
controversy among iwi (Webster 2002), while the case of the Tainui 
settlement demonstrates that the distribution within iwi is also contested. 
In New Zealand, the government has stipulated a legal framework 
within which settlements are to be negotiated. A central feature of the 
government’s preconditions is that compensation will only be transferred 
to tribal organisations with a legal status, which implies that hapü, the core 
groups of Mäori society in the 19th century, become legally subordinated 
to iwi and waka. In addition, the government decided not to negotiate about 
compensation with Mäori organisations in urban environments, where 
nowadays approximately 80 percent of the Mäori population lives. Instead, 
the government selected a limited number of tribes with which it hopes 
to resolve all Mäori grievances. 
These general policy guidelines of the New Zealand government for the 
settlement of Maori grievances are peculiar against the background of the 
consistent rejection of the tribal organisation of Mäori society in the past 
(see Butterworth 1988, Meijl 2003). Still, they clarify why the government 
opted to accept tribal proposals for the implementation of compensation 
agreements, resulting in diverging structures for the implementation of 
settlements (see note 22). Thus, they also explain why the post-settlement 
structure of the Tainui tribal organisation is unique in New Zealand. The 
ownership of the tribal estate has been vested in the royal family, the 
tribal business is to be governed and managed by democratically elected 
councils, but the royal trustees of Waikato’s properties maintain far-reaching 
influences, formally and informally, on the tribe’s companies. As a 
consequence, the compensation settlement with the Waikato-Tainui tribe 
marginalised hapü groupings and significantly enhanced the position 
of the royal family.
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NOTES
1.  Formally the settlement was between Tainui and the Crown, but during the 
negotiations the Crown was represented by the New Zealand government. The 
act passing this settlement in to law, however, was signed by Queen Elizabeth 
II of England, the British Monarch who is Head of State of the commonwealth 
nation of New Zealand.
2.  In Taranaki 1,275,000 acres were confiscated, in the Tauranga area 290,000 
acres, and in the Bay of Plenty 448,000 acres. Altogether 3,215,172 acres of 
land were confiscated on the North Island ( AJHR 1928:G-7). 
3.  A comprehensive history of the Tainui claim has been published by McCan 
(2001).
4.  Letter dated 30-5-1946, Maori Affairs Records 1-5/13/9 (Acc. 2459) Vol. II.
5.  For a summary of the conflict between the New Zealand government and the 
TMTB about the sale of Coalcorp, see Kelsey (1990:154-61).
6.  This view was first expressed in a highly confidential Treasury paper on Maori 
claims leaked in August 1988 (NZH 14/15 Sept. 1988)
7.  The figure of one billion might seem high, but later the Minister of Treaty 
Negotiations admitted it was an unfounded estimate that proved to be grossly 
insufficient.
8.  The “Heads of Agreement between HM the Queen and RTK Mahuta and the 
Tainui Maaori Trust Board and others” was published in the Maori Law Review, 
December 1994-January 1995. 
9.  Queen Te Ata is of the fifth generation descending from the first King Potatau, 
but she is the first woman to lead the King Movement.
10.  The full text of the form of apology and the Deed of Settlement between Her 
Majesty and Waikato Tainui was published in the May issue of the Maori 
Law Review in 1995. 
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11.  Quoted from http://www.tainui-corp.co.nz/raupatu/; see also Hopa (1999:108). 
See also Cheater and Hopa (1997:219).
12.  In what has become known as the Volcanic Interior Plateau claim a group of 
Maori leaders is currently negotiating with the government on a settlement of 
NZ$500 million for the central North Island forests (NZH 2002a). Coming on 
top of the amount of NZ$700 million of compensation that the government has 
paid already or has agreed to pay in Treaty settlements, the Volcanic Interior 
Plateau is likely to breach the NZ $1 billion “fiscal envelop” proposed by the 
Bolger government in 1995. Subsequently, this will trigger further payments to 
both the Tainui and the Ngai Tahu tribes, which have settled their claims in 1995 
and 1998 respectively on the proviso that they would receive proportionate 
increases if total treaty settlements surpassed NZ$1 billion.
13.  See also Seymour (1997:10). Ngapare Hopa was the first Tainui person who 
obtained a Ph.D. She finished her graduate studies at the University of Oxford 
and later taught in the United States for many years until in the mid-1980s 
the Tainui leadership requested her to return to New Zealand and work for the 
Tainui cause. In the course of the negotiations about the Tainui settlement, 
however, she became a stern critic of the structure and the operation of the 
Tainui tribal organisation.
14.  “Tainui Claims Mandate for Deal Despite Low Vote” (Waikato Times 1995).
15.  This construction was not only the responsibility of the Tainui leadership, 
but also of the government which for bureaucratic reasons only wanted to 
deal with large, legal entities.
16.  The Kauhanganui was probably named after the “Great Council” set up by King 
Täwhiao in 1894 to govern the entire North Island (Williams 1969:44-47). 
17.  In the meantime, 65 marae have signed the covenant with the tribal leadership 
of Waikato-Tainui and the Kingitanga. In consequence, membership of the 
Kauhanganui has been expanded to 195 (three representatives for each marae) 
(Waikato Times 2003a). 
18.  Cheater and Hopa (1997:212) even suggest that support for the Kingitanga 
was a criterion for the disbursement of benefits to Waikato marae that have 
suffered from the confiscations.
19.  There is an interesting analogy between the concept of Tekaumaarua ‘Twelve’ 
and the name of the traditional advisory council of the head of the Kingitanga 
made up of 12 prominent elders (in analogy with Jesus’ 12 apostles). The 
council evolved in the 19th century (Gorst 1864:272-80), and its main task was 
to advise the Maori Kings (and later Queen) on protocol and other important 
matters. Over the years, however, with the increasing politicisation of the cause 
of the King Movement’s tribes, institutions such as the Tekaumaarua were 
overshadowed by other bodies such as the TMTB that focused more on 
political affairs. In May 2003 it was announced that the Mäori Queen had 
requested to change the name of Tekaumaarua into Te Arataura ‘Linking 
pathway’, since she did not have any control over the tribe’s executive council 
(Waikato Times 2003b)
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20.  A complete overview of Tainui’s business operations was published on 
http://www.tainui.co.nz/. See also Hopa (1999:111-12).
21.  Quote from the report of Tainui’s Principal Negotiator, Robert Te Kotahi 
Mahuta, to the Annual General Meeting of the Tainui Maaori Trust Board 
in 1997, p.2 (http://www.tainui-corp.co.nz/). Lashley (2000) provides an 
interesting reflection on the government’s obligation to continue to provide 
social and economic services in addition to the restitution of property, which 
is based on the Third Article of the Treaty of Waitangi rather than the Second 
Article on which the settlement’s process is largely focussed.
22.  Needless to say, this loss reinforced the controversy surrounding the 
implementation of the Tainui settlement. It was invariably compared with the 
relative successes of other tribes that had signed a compensation agreement 
with the government, such as the Ngai Tahu which managed to double its 
investments within a few years. This stark contrast also raised the question 
about the relationship between ownership and governance in the post-settlement 
structure of the Tainui tribal organisation. Contrary to Tainui, Ngai Tahu had 
opted to vest the returned properties in the democratically elected Te Ruunanga 
o Ngaai Taahu (TRONT), that was especially set up in 1996 and became owner 
and governor of the tribe’s settlement at the same time (see also Sissons 1995, 
Waymouth 2003). The different types of organisational structure of Tainui and 
Ngai Tahu raise the question regarding the boundaries of government flexibility 
when dealing with different tribal traditions.
23. Principal Negotiator’ Report in the Annual Report of the Tainui Maaori Trust 
Board of 1998 (He Riipoata-a-Tau-1998), pp.7-8.
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